The beer game is a decentralized, multi-agent, cooperative problem that can be modeled as a serial supply chain network in which agents cooperatively attempt to minimize the total cost of the network even though each agent can only observe its own local information. We develop a variant of the Deep Q-Network algorithm to solve this problem. Extensive numerical experiment show the effectiveness of our algorithm. Unlike most algorithms in literature, our algorithm does not have any limits on the parameter values, and it provides good solutions even if the agents do not follow a rational policy. The algorithm can be extended to other decentralized multi-agent cooperative games with partially observed information, which is a common type of situation in supply chain problems.
Introduction
The beer game consists of a serial supply chain network with four agents-a retailer, a warehouse, a distributor, and a manufacturer-that are arranged sequentially and numbered 1 to 4, respectively (see Figure 1 ). The retailer node faces stochastic demand from its customers, and the manufacturer node has an unlimited source of supply. There are deterministic transportation lead times (l tr ), though the total lead time is stochastic due to stockouts upstream imposed on the flow of product from upstream to downstream, as well as deterministic lead times on the flow of information (l f i ) from downstream to upstream (replenishment orders). Each agent may have nonzero shortage and holding costs. In each period of the game, each agent chooses the order quantity q i to submit to its predecessor (supplier) to minimize the long-run system-wide costs, i.e. T t=1
where i is the index of the agents; t = 1, . . . , T is the index of the time periods; T is the (random) time horizon of the game; c i h and c i p are the holding and shortage cost coefficients, respectively, of agent i; and IL i t is the inventory level of agent i in period t. If IL i t > 0, then the agent has inventory on-hand, and if IL i t < 0, then it has backorders, i.e., unmet demands that are owed to customers.
The agents may not communicate in any way, and they do not share any local inventory statistics or cost information with other agents until the end of the game, at which time all agents are made aware of the system-wide cost. In other words, each agent makes decisions with only partial information about the environment while also cooperating with other agents to minimize the total cost of the system, which underlies the decision making in every real-world supply chain. Indeed, according to the categorization by [8] , the beer game is a decentralized, Independent Learners (ILs), multiagent cooperative problem. The beer game assumes the agents incur holding and stockout costs but not fixed ordering costs, and therefore the optimal inventory policy is a base-stock policy in which each stage orders a sufficient quantity to bring its inventory position (on-hand plus on-order inventory minus backorders) equal to a fixed number, called its base-stock level. The optimal basestock levels can be obtained using the well known algorithm by [7] (or its subsequent reworkings by Figure 1 : Generic view of the beer game network. [5, 12] ) when there are no stockout costs at the upstream stages, i.e., c i p = 0, i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. There is no algorithm to find the optimal base-stock levels for general stockout cost structures. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for solving this problem that is based on Deep Q-Networks (DQN) [27] .
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary of the relevant literature and our contributions to it. The details of the algorithm are introduced in Section 3, and Section 4 provides numerical experiments. Section 5 provides conclusions.
Literature Review

Current State of the Art
The beer game consists of a serial supply chain network. Under the conditions dictated by the game (zero fixed ordering costs, no ordering capacities, linear holding and backorder costs, etc.), a base-stock inventory policy is optimal at each stage [21] . If the demand process and costs are stationary, then so are the optimal base-stock levels, which implies that in each period (except the first), each stage simply orders from its supplier exactly the amount that was demanded from it. If the customer demands are iid random and if backorder costs are incurred only at stage 1, then the optimal base-stock levels can be found using the exact algorithm by [7] ; see also [5, 12] .
There is a substantial literature on the beer game. We review some of that literature here, considering both independent learners (ILs) and joint action learners (JALs) [8] ; for a more comprehensive review, see [22, 3, 11] . In the category of ILs, [28] developed a simulation and tested different ordering policies, which are expressed using a formula that involves state variables. [33] proposes a formula (which we call the Sterman formula) to determine the order quantity based on the current backlog of orders, on hand inventory, incoming and outgoing shipments, incoming orders, and expected demand. In a nutshell, the Sterman formula attempts to model the way human players over-or under-react to situations they observe in the supply chain such as shortages or excess inventory. Subsequent behavioral studies using the beer game include [16, 6, 9] and [10] . Scenario based analysis also includes [36, 14] which propose some scenarios and analyze them through simulation.
All of the optimization methods described in the first paragraph of this section assume that every agent follows a base-stock policy. The hallmark of the beer game, however, is that players do not tend to follow such a policy, or any policy. Often their behavior is quite irrational. There is comparatively little literature on how a given agent should optimize its inventory decisions when the other agents do not play rationally-that is, how a single player can best play the beer game.
In some of the beer game literature, the authors assume the agents are Joint Action Learners (JALs), i.e. the information of inventory positions is shared among all agents, a significant difference compared to classical ILs models. For example, [17] proposes a GA which gets the current snapshot of each agent and decide how much to order according to d + x rule, in which agent i observes d i t which is the received demand/order in period t, and decides negative or positive x i t to deduct/ add to d i t , resulting to order amount d i t + x i t .
[13] considered a three agents beer game and proposed a Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithm to make decision, in which state variable is defined as the three inventory positions, which each are discretized into 10 intervals. The action also is limited to integer numbers in [0, 30] . [4] introduced also same Q-learning algorithm that x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
In previous paragraphs, we reviewed different approaches to solve the beer game. Although the model of [7] can solve some types of serial systems, for more general serial systems neither the form nor the parameters of the optimal policy are known. Moreover, even in systems for which a base-stock policy is optimal, such a policy may no longer be optimal for a given agent if the other agents do not follow it. The heuristic formulas for beer-game play in the literature [33, 28] or their extensions [17, 35] do not provide a guarantee of optimality. They also assume the demand comes from a stationary distribution, which may not be a realistic assumption.
In addition, classical RL algorithms can handle only a small or reduced-size state space. Accordingly, the current applications of RL in the beer game or even simpler supply chain networks also assume (implicitly or explicitly) that size of the state space is small [4, 13, 15, 34, 31] . This is unrealistic in the beer game, since the state variable representing a given agent's inventory level can be any number in [−∞, +∞]. Solving such an RL problem would be nearly impossible, as the model would be extremely expensive to train. Moreover, [4, 13] which model beer game-like settings, assume sharing of information, which is not the typical assumption in the beer game. Also, to handle the curse of dimensionality, they proposed mapping the state variable onto a small number of tiles, which leads to the loss of valuable state information and therefore of accuracy.
On the other hand, the beer game can be categorized as a Dec-POMDP since there are multiple agents that cooperate in a decentralized manner to achieve a common goal. Due to the partial observability and the non-stationarity of local observations of each agent, Dec-POMDPs are extremely hard and are categorized as NEXP-complete problems [2] . Considering the general algorithms for solving Dec-POMDPs, the algorithm proposed by [37] cannot be used for the beer game since they consider the possibility of agent communications with some penalty. Similarly, [29, 32, 19] propose algorithms to solve Dec-POMDP while assuming there is a reward shared by all agents that is known by all agents in every period, which is not the case in the beer game; so, their model cannot be applied. For a survey of research on ILs with shared rewards, see [25] .
Another possible approach to tackle this problem might be classical supervised machine learning algorithms [20] . However, these algorithms also cannot be used for the beer game, since there is no historical data in the form of "correct" input/output pairs. According to our understanding of the literature, there is a large gap between the needs and what the current algorithms can handle. In order to fill this gap, we propose a variant of the DQN algorithm to obtain the order quantities in the beer game. DQN has been applied to many competitive games (see [23] ) and we modify it to make is suitable for a cooperative game.
Our Contribution
In order to solve the beer game, we propose a DQN algorithm [27] , although we modify it substantially, since DQN works for single-agent competitive zero-sum games and the beer game is a multi-agent decentralized cooperative non-zero-sum game. In other words, DQN provides actions for one agent that interacts with an environment in a competitive setting, and the beer game is a cooperative game. Also, beer game agents are playing independently and do not have any information from other agents until the game ends and the total cost is revealed, which is not the case in DQN, which usually assumes the agent has full environment's information at any time step t of the game.
One naive approach to extend the DQN algorithm to solve the beer game is to use multiple DQNs, one to control the actions of each agent. However, using DQN as the decision maker of each agent results in a competitive game in which each DQN agent plays independently to minimize its own cost. For example, consider a beer game in which players 2, 3, and 4 each have a stand-alone, well-trained DQN and the retailer (stage 1) uses a base-stock policy to make decisions. With these settings and a uniform demand of U(0, 2),
DQN for Beer Game
In this section, we present the details of our variant of the DQN algorithm to solve the beer game. In our algorithm a DQN agent has access to its local information and considers other agents as a part of its environment. The details of the feedback scheme, Q-learning, state and action space, reward function, DNN approximator, and the DQN algorithm are discussed below.
State variable: Consider agent i in time step t. Let OO i t denote the on-order items at agent i, i.e., the items that have been ordered from agent i + 1 but not received yet; let d i t denote the demand/order received from agent i − 1; let RS i t denote the items received from agent i + 1; let a i t denote the action agent i takes; and let IL i t denote the inventory level as defined in section 1. We interpret d 0 t to represent the end-customer demand and RS 5 t to represent the shipment received by agent 4 from the external supplier. In each period t of the game, agent i ob-
and RS i t . In other words, in period t agent i has historical observations
, and does not have any information about the other agents. Thus, the agent has to make its decision with partially observed information of the environment. In addition, any beer game will finish in a finite time horizon, so the problem can be modeled as a POMDP in which each historic sequence o i t is a distinct state and the size of the vector o i t grows over time, which is difficult for the any RL and DNN algorithm to handle. To address this issue, we capture only the last m periods (e.g., m = 3) and use them as the state variable. Considering this, the input size remains fixed throughout the game, and a reasonable choice of m makes it a computationally affordable problem to solve. To summarize, we define the state variable of agent i in time t as
In our algorithm, DNN plays the rule of the Q-function approximator, gets input s and provides the Q-value as output for all possible actions a so that the DNN output is of size |A|. Thus, we provide as input the m previous state variables into the DNN and get as output Q(s, a) for every possible action a ∈ A(s).
Action space: In each period of the game, each agent can order any amount in [0, ∞). Since we designed our DNN structure to provide the Q-value of all possible actions in the output, having an action space of infinite size is not practical. So, to limit the cardinality of the action space, we use a d + x rule for selecting the order quantity: The agent determines how much more or less to order than its received order; that is, the order quantity is d + x, where x is in some bounded set. Thus, the output of the DNN is x ∈ [a l , a u ] (a l , a u ∈ Z), so that the action space is of size |a u − a l + 1|.
Experience replay:
We use experience replay [24] and take a mini-batch from it in every DNN training step. In this way, in iteration t of the algorithm, agent i's observation e i t = (s i t , a i t , r i t , s i t+1 ) is added to the experience memory of the agent so that E i includes {e i 1 , e i 2 , . . . , e i t } in period t. Then, in order to avoid having correlated observations, we select a random mini-batch of the agent's experience replay to train the corresponding DNN (if applicable). This approach breaks the correlations among the training data and reduces the variance of the output [26] . Also, due to memory limits we keep only the last M observations.
Reward function: In iteration t of the game, agent i observes state variable s i t and takes action a i t ; we need to know the corresponding reward value r i t to measure the quality of action a i t . State variable s i t+1 provides IL i t+1 and thus the corresponding shortage or holding costs, and we consider the summation of these costs for r i t . However, since there are information and transportation lead times, there is a delay between taking action a i t and observing its effect on the reward. Moreover, the reward r i t reflects not only the action taken in period t, but also those taken in previous periods, and it is not possible to decompose r i t to isolate the effects of each of these actions. However, defining the state variable to include information from the last m periods resolves this issue; the reward r i
T t=1 r i t T and τ i = T t=1 r i t T , i.e. the average reward of a game per period and the average reward of agent i per period, respectively. After the end of each episode of the game, for each DQN agent i we update its observed reward in all T time steps in the experience replay memory using r i t = r i t + βi 3 (ω − τ i ), ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, where β i is a regularization coefficient for agent i. With this procedure, agent i gets appropriate feedback about its actions and learns to take actions that result in minimum total cost, not locally optimal solutions. This feedback scheme gives the agents a sort of implicit communication mechanism, even though they do not communicate directly.
Determining the value of m: As noted above, the DNN maintains information from the most recent m periods in order to keep the size of the state variable fixed and to address the issue with the delayed observation of the reward. In order to select an appropriate value for m, one has to consider the value of the lead times throughout the game. First, when agent i takes a given action a i t at time t, it does not observe its effect until at least l tr i periods later, when the order may be received. Moreover, node i + 1 may not have enough stock to satisfy the order immediately, in which case the shipment is delayed and in the worst case agent i will not observe the corresponding reward r i t before 4 j=i (l tr j + l f i j ). However, the Q-learning algorithm needs the reward r i t to evaluate the action a i t taken. Thus, m should be chosen at least as large as 4 j=i (l tr j + l f i j ). On the other hand, selecting a large value for m results in a large input size for the DNN, which increases the training time. Therefore, selecting m is a trade-off between accuracy and computation time, and m should be selected according to the required level of accuracy and the available computation power.
We have same algorithm as DQN algorithm [27] which interacts with a beer game simulator, in which in period t agent i takes action a i t , satisfies the on hand demand/order d t−1 , observes the new demand d t , and then receives the shipments I t . This sequence of events results in the new state s t+1 . Feeding s t+1 into the target DNN network provides the corresponding Q-value for state s t+1 and all possible actions. The action with the smallest Q-value is our choice. The only modification in DQN algorithm is that in the end of each training episode, the feedback scheme is run and updates the corresponding experience replay. The algorithm is provided in Supplementary Material.
Numerical Experiment
In order to validate our algorithm, we compare the results of our algorithm to those obtained using the heuristic by [33] and,the optimal solutions by [7] .
Our DNN network is a fully connected network, in which each node has a ReLU activation function. The input is of size 5m, the number of hidden layers is randomly selected as either two or three, and the output is of size 5, using a l = −2 and a u = 2. With two hidden layers, the shape of the network is [5m, 130, 90, 5], and with three hidden layers it is [5m, 130, 90, 50, 5]. Adam optimizer [18] with a batch size of 32 is used to optimize the network. Although the Adam optimizer has its own weight decaying procedure, we used exponential decay with a stair of 10000 iterations with rate 0.98 to decay the learning rate further. We trained each agent on 40000 episodes and used a replay memory of the 10 6 most recently observed experiences. Also, the training of the DNN starts after observing at least 500 episodes of the game. The -greedy algorithm starts with = 1 and linearly reduces it to 0.05 in the first 80% of iterations. All of the computations are done with Tensorflow 0.12.0 [1] .
Our beer game has information and shipment lead times of two periods each. The demand is an integer uniformly drawn from {0, 1, 2} and c p = [2, 0, 0, 0] and c h = [2, 2, 2, 2]. Moreover, the rewards are normalized by diving them by 200, which helps produce smaller loss values and smaller gradients. Since the sum of the lead times is eight, we considered m ∈ {5, 10}.
The value of the feedback coefficient β i heavily depends on τ j for j = i. For example, when τ i is one order of magnitude larger than τ j , for all j = i, it needs a larger coefficient to get more feedback from the other agents. Indeed, the feedback coefficient has a similar role as the regularization parameter λ in the lasso loss function, whose value depends on the -norm of the variables, although there is no given rule to propose the right value for λ. Similarly, proposing a given rule or value for each β i is not possible as it depends on τ i ∀i. For example, we found that a very large β i does not work well, since the agent tries to decrease other agents' costs rather than its own. Similarly, with a very small β i , the agent learns how to minimize its own cost instead of the total cost. Therefore, we used a similar cross validation approach to find good values for each β i .
We focused on cases in which a single DQN plays with non-DQN agents, e.g., simulated human players. We considered two types of simulated human players. In section 4.1, we discuss results for the case in which one DQN agent plays in a network that the other players use a base-stock policy to choose their actions. (In this case the non-DQN agents behave rationally.) Then, in section 4.2, we assume that the other three agents use the Sterman formula [33] ), which models irrational play.
For the cost coefficients and other settings specified for our beer game, it is optimal for all players to follow a base-stock policy, and we use this policy (with the optimal parameters as determined by the method of [7] as a benchmark and a lower bound on the optimal total cost. The optimal vector of base-stock levels is [7, 3, 3, 1] . The resulting optimal expected cost per episode is 1.65, which is allocated to stages 1-4 as [1.50, 0.03, 0.06, 0.06].
DQN Plus Base-Stock Policy
In this section, we present the results of our algorithm when the other three agents use a base-stock policy. We consider four cases, with the DQN playing the role of each of the four players and the other three agents using a base-stock policy. We then compare the results of our algorithm with the results of the case that all players follow the optimal base-stock policy, which we call optm hereinafter.
The results of the four cases are shown in Figure 2 As shown in Figure 2a , when the DQN plays the retailer, β 1 ∈ {50, 100} works well. As we move upstream in the supply chain (warehouse, then distributor, then manufacturer), smaller β values become more effective (see Figures 2b-2d) . Recall that the retailer bears the largest share of the optimal expected cost per period, and as a result it needs a larger β than the other agents. Figure 3 shows the details of IL, OO, a, and r for the retailer agent when the retailer is played by the DQN with β 1 = 50, using a base-stock policy (optm), and Sterman formula (Strm) . The base-stock policy (optm) and DQN have similar IL and OO trends, and as a result their rewards are also very close: optm has a cost of [1.42, 0.00, 0.02, 0.05] (total 1.49) and DQN has [1.43, 0.01, 0.02, 0.08] (total 1.54). (Note that optm has a slightly different cost here than reported on page 6 because those costs are the average costs of 50 samples while this cost is from a single sample.) Similar trends are observed when the DQN plays the other three roles; see Supplementary Material. This suggests that the DQN can successfully learn to play nearly optimally when the other agents also play optimally. Figure 4 shows the results of the case in which the three non-DQN agents use Sterman formula [33] instead of a base-stock policy (see Supplementary Material for the formula and its parameters). We train the network using values of β ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 75, 100}, and compare their results to each other. (β values that performed very poorly are omitted from some of the sub-figures.) We also compare them to the case in which the single agent is played using a base-stock policy and the other three agents continue to use the Sterman formula, a case we call Strm-optm.
DQN Plus Sterman Formula
From the figure, it is evident that under appropriate choices of β, the DQN plays much better than Strm-optm. This is because if the other three agents do not follow a base-stock policy, it is no longer optimal for the fourth agent to follow a base-stock policy, or to use the same base-stock level. In general, the optimal inventory policy when other agents do not follow a base-stock policy is an open question. This figure suggests that our DQN is able to learn to play effectively in this setting. Table 1 give the cost of all four agents when a given agent plays using DQN and a base-stock policy and the other agents play using the Sterman formula. From the tables, we can see that the DQN produces similar (but slightly smaller) costs than a base-stock policy when used by the retailer, and significantly smaller costs than a base-stock policy when used by the other agents. Indeed, the DQN learns how to play to decrease the costs of the other agents, and not just its own costs-for example, the retailer's and warehouse's costs are significantly lower when the distributor uses DQN than they are when the distributor uses a base-stock policy. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Figure 4 . This shows the power of DQN when it plays against agents that do not play rationally, i.e., do not follow a base-stock policy, which is common in real-world supply chains. Finally, we note that when all agents follow the Sterman formula, the average cost of the agents is [10.81, 10.76, 10.96, 12.6], for a total of 45.13, much higher than when any one agent uses DQN.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the details of IL, OO, a, and r for the manufacturer when the manufacturer is played by the DQN with β 4 = 100, using a base-stock policy (Strm-optm), and Sterman formula 
Conclusion and Future work
In this paper, we consider the beer game, a decentralized, multi-agent cooperative supply chain problem. A base-stock inventory policy is known to be optimal for special cases, but once some of the agents do not follow a base-stock policy (as is common in real-world supply chains), the optimal policy of the remaining players is unknown. To address this issue, we propose an algorithm based on DQN. The algorithm does not require knowledge of the demand probability distribution and uses only historical data. Furthermore, it obtains near-optimal solutions when playing alongside agents who follow a base-stock policy and performs much better than a base-stock policy when the other agents use a more realistic model of ordering behavior.
A natural extension of this paper is to applying our algorithm to supply chain networks with other topologies, e.g., distribution networks. Another important extension is developing algorithms capable of handling larger, or even continuous, action spaces will improve the accuracy of our algorithm. Figure 6 : IL t , OO t , a t , and r t of all agents when DQN plays retailer and agents follow base-stock policy.
actions according to the base stock policy. Similarly, Figures 7, 8 , and 9 presents the results when warehouse, distributer, and manufacturer take actions with DQN and other three agents play with base-stock policy.
Moreover, Figure 13 provides the results of case that the DQN retailer plays with three Strm agents, which its manufacturer play details is presented in section 4.2. Similarly, Figures 10, 11 , and 12 presents the results when retailer, warehouse, and distributer take actions with DQN and other players follow Strm formula. In each of the figures, from top, the first set of figures provide the results of retailer, the second, third, and fourth sets are the warehouse, distributer, and manufacturer results respectively. Figure 7 : IL t , OO t , a t , and r t of all agents when DQN plays warehouse and agents follow basestock policy. Figure 8 : IL t , OO t , a t , and r t of all agents when DQN plays distributer and agents follow basestock policy. Figure 9 : IL t , OO t , a t , and r t of all agents when DQN plays manufacturer and agents follow base-stock policy. Figure 10 : IL t , OO t , a t , and r t of all agents when DQN plays retailer and agents use Sterman formula. Figure 11 : IL t , OO t , a t , and r t of all agents when DQN plays warehouse and agents use Sterman formula. Figure 12 : IL t , OO t , a t , and r t of all agents when DQN plays distributer and agents use Sterman formula. Figure 13 : IL t , OO t , a t , and r t of all agents when DQN plays manufacturer and agents use Sterman formula.
